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This paper examines the participation of stakeholders in environmental policy formulation and 
implementation. After a short discussion of the main functions and challenges of environmental 
governance the paper addresses the issue of stakeholder participation and the claim of “democratic 
deficits” in international environmental governance. It stresses that while non-state actor involvement 
does not necessarily increase democratic legitimacy, it may nevertheless increase the quality of the 
environmental policy processes. It will then argue that certain international processes such as the UN 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) have led to an unsatisfactory situation of non-state actor 
involvement where excessive formalization and proceduralization impede active interaction and input of 
expertise from non-state actors. It seems that the interaction between state and non-state actors in some of 
today’s international processes, such as the CSD, has led to a zero-sum game1 where no party is really 
benefiting from the contributions of the other. This paper will suggest several changes to get beyond this 
zero-sum game mentality, including de-formalization of participation, replacement of generalist non-
governmental organizations with those that specialize in specific fields, and reformation of the 
relationship between state and non-state actors so that each might come to see the other as a partner, not 
as a competitor. It will conclude by arguing that neither the alleged lack of an authoritative, effective 
central institution addressing the main environmental problems, nor the so-called “democratic deficit” is 
the main challenge to today’s international environmental governance, but the lack of political will. 
Political will, however, is not an absolute; it can and has to be stimulated. And this may be one of the 





The international environmental policy processes are often criticized for inadequate involvement 
of non-state actors such as NGOs or international organizations. This is often referred to as a 
‘democratic deficit’. Yet my experiences as head of delegation or lead negotiator for the Swiss 
government in the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) or in international 
chemicals negotiations such as the development of the Strategic Approach to International 
Chemicals Management (SAICM) have revealed that not all NGO participation is as fruitful as 
often claimed. In some international processes such as the CSD, NGO participation has become 
an overly formalized procedure that prevents rather than stimulates interaction and exchange 
within the NGO community and Commission participants. Today’s interaction between state and 
non-state actors in the CSD can be described as a zero-sum game where no party is benefiting 
from the contributions of the other. The expertise and perspectives of non-state actors, however, 
is invaluable to consensus decision-making, policy-formulation and eventual impact through 
international governance like the CSD. This article proposes the following steps to increase the 
effectiveness of non-state actors in environmental policy processes: a de-formalization of non-
state actor involvement, a replacement of generalist NGOs with those that specialize in specific 
fields, a reformation of the relationship between state and non-state actors so that each might 
come to see the other as a partner, not as a competitor, and finally a strategic change whereby 
NGOs re-focus their energy towards raising public awareness, influencing nations’ negotiation 
positions, and triggering the political will and commitment that is needed to effectively formulate 
and implement the policies of environmental governance. 
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Today, it is well recognized that threats to the environment undermine the resource base of 
human development and well-being. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2005) has held, 
“[o]ur efforts to defeat poverty and pursue sustainable development will be in vain if 
environmental degradation and natural resource depletion continue unabated.” In order to 
address the challenge of global environmental degradation and natural resource depletion, a 
complex and multi-layered international environmental governance structure has materialized 
over the past few decades with an abundance of institutions, organizations and processes 
emerging—sometimes overlapping, sometimes cooperating, oftentimes conflicting. Several 
factors contribute to the lack of effectiveness and efficiency of today’s system of international 
environmental governance, namely its fragmentation, the dilution of the authority of its core-
institutions such as the UN Environment Programme UNEP, the imbalance between the 
environmental regime and other regimes, the lack of institutional leadership within the 
international environmental regime, the inefficient use of already limited resources, and the lack 
of political will and commitment. 2 To further complicate the situation, this governmental 
environmental structure is complemented by an intricate network of thousands of active non-
government organizations, initiatives and action groups. Environmental governance has become 
so complex, that even specialists have lost oversight.  
 
This paper examines the participation of stakeholders (i.e. all actors that have an interest at stake, 
thus both states as well as non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations and  
international organizations3) in forming and implementing international environmental policy.  
One body of stakeholders commonly discussed is that of “nongovernmental organizations” 
(NGOs), which is understood as including both, so-called "public interests NGOs" and industry 
and business representatives. The paper will focus on the international level of environmental 
governance and will draw from experiences of international processes, such as those of the 
United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and international chemicals 




After a short discussion of environmental governance, its actors and institutions, and its main 
functions and challenges (Section 2), the paper will address the issue of NGO participation and 
the claim of a “democratic deficit”4 in international environmental governance. It will stress that 
while NGO involvement does not directly increase the democratic legitimacy as such (Section 
3), it may nevertheless increase the quality of environmental policy processes (Section 4). It will 
then argue that over time, NGO participation has become an overly formalized procedure that 
prevents rather than stimulates interaction between conference participants. This is especially the 
case in processes like the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), 
where stakeholder participation is confined to a portion of any given meeting known as the 
“multi-stakeholder segment.” Today, interaction in the CSD could be said to represent a zero-
sum game where the contributions of one party are seen as hindrances by the other. On the other 
hand, there are processes such as the development of the Strategic Approach to International 
Chemicals Management that do not limit stakeholder participation to specific segments and 
which are characterized by abundant, interactive and direct stakeholder involvement throughout 
negotiations and the decision making process. The paper will suggest that a de-formalization of 
non-state actor involvement is imperative to allow for valuable active stakeholder participation. 
A proposed method for how such reforms can be made will be detailed in this paper.  It will 
conclude that non-state actor involvement may be less effective in general environmental 
governance processes addressing broad issues. Similarly, NGOs with a very general background 
may have less impact on specialised political processes. On the other hand, in processes where 
the issue in question is more specific, NGOs and stakeholders with greater expertise in specific 
fields will be vital as active participants in policy making (Section 5). Finally, it will argue that 
neither the alleged lack of an authoritative, effective central institution addressing the main 
environmental problems, nor the so called “democratic deficit” are the main challenge to today’s 
international environmental governance, but the lack of political will, i.e. the continued political 
prioritization of other issues over the environment. Non-state actors such as NGOs, however, can 
be crucial in addressing this lack of political will. 
 
2. Functions, Actors and Institutions of Environmental Governance 




Environmental governance is the political and administrative system established to address 
environmental problems. It embraces institutions, principles, rules, procedures and instruments 
that regulate, manage, and implement the processes of environmental protection.5 The function 
of environmental governance is to provide a comprehensive, coherent, effective and efficient 
framework for the protection and sustainable use of natural resources.6 
 
Traditionally, it is argued that the main pillars of an environmental institutional framework are 
government authorities, appointed and authorised by elected officials to carry out tasks at the 
national (federal) and sub-national (regional and lower) levels. This traditional model has been 
changing rapidly - non-state actors are no longer seen only as an “object” of environmental 
policy, they have also become a “subject” of environmental policy making. Today, non-state 
actors are fulfilling increasingly important roles as engines of international environmental 
policy-making, setting agendas for international policy processes and development, providing 
knowledge and scientific information, monitoring implementation of international policies and 
lobbying state actors. They are also involved in partnership initiatives with governments, as well 
as the development of voluntary standards, and implementation of environmental protection 
programs.7 The establishment of private label schemes such as that from the Forest Stewardship 
Council, a not-for-profit organization established to promote the responsible management of the 
world’s forests, is a prominent example of international environmental governance conducted 
without national government involvement.8 Today more than ever there is a growing corpus of 
rules, principles and decisions with a direct impact on private actors that has not been negotiated 
in a traditional inter-state context. Rules such as technical guidelines for best available 
technologies and best environmental practices are often made by international organizations with 
strong support from non-state expertises and the direct participation of non-state actors; 
international partnerships are being formed between public and private entities; international 
codes of conduct are being developed by private actors or private initiatives such as the Forest 
Stewardship Council. All of the above have become important elements of international 
environmental governance. Thus, international governmental organisations and non-state actors 
such as non-governmental organizations, corporations, other collectives and even individuals 




b) Institutions and Challenges 
 
Governance can generally be seen as the system how actors, through institutions and processes, 
identify, address and solve common problems.10 It addresses not only how decisions are being 
made, who is responsible for making decisions, how decision makers carry out their mandate and 
how they are held accountable,11 but also how decisions are implemented and reviewed. 
International environmental governance is thus the international regime that has been developed 
to identify, address and solve environmental problems.12 International environmental governance 
is relatively young and dynamic. Over time, a multi-layered regime has emerged, and a 
proliferation of instruments, processes, institutions and actors has evolved that bears the risk of 
duplication and even of conflict.13 Today’s multi-layered international environment regime and 
its numerous institutions and processes demand an increased level of international cooperation; it 
might even be argued that cooperation is increasingly an obligation or necessary duty of state 
actors.14 Non-state actors, however, seem not to bear such a responsibility to cooperate.  
 
The United Nations’ Environment Programme UNEP is one of the main institutions of today’s 
international environmental governance. However, UNEP is lacking resources, authority and 
support to fulfil its role as central pillar of the international environmental regime. In addition to 
UNEP, over 500 international environmental treaties and multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention 
on Biodiversity or the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the Ozone Layer have addressed 
specific environmental concerns. Each treaty establishes specific rules and obligations and 
creates its own mini-institutional machinery that includes annual meetings and an administrative 
structure to serve these meetings and to oversee the implementation of the conventions’ 
directives.15  
 
In addition, while the UNEP and the international environmental treaties and MEAs have the 
primary political-normative functions of international environmental governance, their work is 
complemented by specialized organizations and institutions such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organization, the International Maritime Organization, or the UN Commission on Sustainable 
Development. Today, many of the most important decisions affecting the environment stem from 
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institutions and processes outside of the complex web of the core global environmental 
governance system like the WTO, multilateral development banks or bilateral investment and 
free-trade agreements.16 Additionally, implementation and financing of environmental activities 
is often tasked to other institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme UNDP, 
the World Bank, the Global Environment Facility, the United Nations Institute for Training and 
Research UNITAR, or United Nations Industrial Development Organization UNIDO. 
 
This proliferation of MEAs, international environmental rule-setting bodies, and organizations 
and institutions engaged in environmental activities, often with overlapping or conflicting goals 
and strategies has lead to a fragmentation within the sphere of international environmental 
governance.17 Due to the weak position of the UNEP, there is a lack of cooperation and 
coordination among the different relevant international institutions and a lack of implementation 
and enforcement, and the limited financial resources are not always used efficiently.18 These 
challenges or shortcomings of the international environmental regime can be structured into four 
groups or clusters: i) insufficient commitment to and prioritization of environmental 
considerations by states, ii) fragmentation of the regime, iii) limited authority and limited 
resources of UNEP, and iv) a structural and institutional imbalance between the environmental 
regime and other regimes.19 This proliferation of international environmental institutions and 
processes also makes it difficult for state and non-state actors to follow the work of all the 
relevant institutions and processes in international environmental governance. 
 
In response to its weaknesses, several propositions have been made to strengthen international 
environmental governance over the past several years.20 The most recent initiative was taken at 
the 2005 UN World Summit, which recognized the need for more efficient international 
environmental governance with enhanced coordination, improved policy advice and guidance, 
strengthened scientific knowledge and assessment, better treaty compliance, as well as better 
integration of environmental activities in the broader sustainable development framework; at the 
operational level, the heads of state and government agreed to explore the possibility of a more 
coherent institutional framework to address this need.21 It is interesting to note that all these 
propositions refer to institutional aspects of international environmental governance and politics 
and that they make no specific reference to the involvement and the general role of non-state 
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actors. However, non-state actors can significantly contribute to addressing several of the 
identified needs.  
 
 
3. Stakeholder Involvement and the Claim of a “Democratic Deficit” 
 
The involvement of non-governmental actors in the international environmental policy regime is 
a typical characteristic of environmental governance. The UN Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD) is said to have been a pioneer in engaging non-governmental actors in its 
work by including in its annual meetings “multi-stakeholder dialogues” where representatives 
from diverse sectors convene and share their experience and forge common grounds. This has 
led to a significant increase in NGO representatives from around the world attending CSD 
meetings.22 Today, non-governmental organizations regularly participate as observers at 
meetings of international environmental institutions and processes and make effective use of 
their right to intervene and submit their views and proposals.  
 
Nevertheless, the involvement of non-state actors is often said to be insufficient and international 
institutions and processes are frequently criticized for suffering from a “democratic deficit.” The 
increased involvement of these non-state actors is said to be crucial, as they are typically deemed 
representatives of the global civil society and of the public interest worldwide; enhancing their 
role in international decision-making would enhance the democratic legitimacy of international 
institutions and processes. 
 
The claim that NGO participation can enhance the democratic legitimacy of international 
governance relies on the assumption that the concept of democracy can as such be directly 
applied to international governance.23 “Democracy” is generally understood as a form of 
government in which the supreme power is held by the people, i.e. all individual subjects of the 
government live under a free electoral and participatory system.24 Democracy is thus a form of 
self-governance by the people of a political entity. Since there is no global government (a single 
government responsible for the political functioning and decision-making of the whole globe) 
and no global “people” (demos), international governance is difficult to associate with the act of 
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democratic governing. And, it is argued that because of the fundamental absence of the premise 
of majority rule on a global scale, the concept of democracy seems hardly applicable to 
international governance, and any attempt to bring international governance “into the laboratory 
of democracy will result in a reductionist and impoverished understanding of international law, 
of democracy and of the actual and potential relationship between the two.”25  
 
However, even if the applicability of democratic principles to international governance were to 
be accepted, the claim that NGO participation could correct a so-called democratic deficit of 
international governance seems to be superficial and short-sighted. In fact, NGOs represent the 
views of specific interest groups – this does by no means imply that NGOs represent the general 
public or a “global civil society.” Therefore, NGOs do not have greater democratic legitimacy 
than governments and cannot justify playing an activist role through arguing that they better 
represent the public than government representatives.26 While it could be argued that the 
aggregation of NGOs as agents of special interests could theoretically holistically represent the 
views of the global community in the same way that democracies incorporate the special 
interests held by their constituents, this is not the case. For such democratic aggregation to occur, 
all views and interests would have to be represented by specific NGOs, each with equal access to 
the international decision making processes. Since this is not the case, this counter-argument 
may is not convincing. In fact, the involvement of stakeholders in international governance may 
even pose democratic challenges: while it’s assumed that governments defend the interests of the 
states they represent, and while government authorities are typically appointed and authorised by 
elected officials to carry out their tasks, NGOs and stakeholders exert their influence without 
such control by and accountability to the general public. Thus, the active NGO and stakeholder 
involvement in international environmental governance could raise concerns with respect to their 
accountability and democratic legitimacy. 
 
This concern of accountability and democratic legitimacy becomes even more pressing if the 
existence of a “New World Order” is accepted, as is proposed by Anne-Marie Slaughter:27 
Building on examples where international institutions function effectively when drawing 
significantly upon the existence of informal policy networks, Slaughter presents a world that is 
largely run by networks of elites with close personal ties to one another. In her model, the 
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individuals who make up these networks are public servants such as regulators, bureaucrats, 
diplomats and judges—personalities with explicit mandates under public law, formally held 
accountable to the people through elected governments and representative institutions. While 
Slaughter’s “network” conception seems to depend on the continuing viability of a clear 
boundary between public and private, there is a real risk that these networks operate in a way 
“whereby network ‘insiders,’ both governmental and non-governmental, cooperate in a manner 
that defies formal boundaries between public and private”.28 But if global governance is run by 
networks that include both governmental and non-governmental actors, then the selection of who 
should be a member of the decision-making body becomes complex and raises important 
questions of accountability and legitimacy, as the general public is excluded from the selection 
of the members of the network and the non-governmental members of the network are not 
accountable to the general public but to special interests.  
 
 
4. The Benefits of NGO and Stakeholder Participation 
 
Although the claim that NGOs would enhance the democratic legitimacy of international 
environmental governance must be rejected, there are nevertheless other important benefits of 
non-state actor involvement in international environmental policy making and implementation. 
NGOs, as compared to state actors, have the benefit of being able to focus on one specific 
interest and can express themselves more freely on that issue, being less constrained by the 
general interest of a specific nation at large. Moreover, NGOs often have specific expertise and 
knowledge. They enhance public support and assist in the domestic internalization and 
implementation of internationally agreed norms and commitments. Additionally, “[i]n being 
entrepreneurial, NGOs compete with other actors in a dynamic marketplace of ideas” and can be 
more creative in constructing and encouraging new norms, and new models of governance.29 
 
Non-state actors can play vital, supportive roles in each step of the process of developing, 
implementing, and monitoring international environmental policies within international 




i) By collecting, analyzing, and disseminating relevant information, drawing attention to new 
and emerging issues that need international attention and by mobilizing public opinion 
through information campaigns and broad outreach activities, they can influence the agenda-
setting of international environmental governance.  
 
ii) They can inspire and shape the development of international norms and policies by providing 
expert advice to state-centered international negotiations, formulating views and expressing 
interests that might otherwise be ignored by state actors, by mobilizing public opinion at the 
national level to influence the position of representatives, and by lobbying and monitoring 
governmental delegations during negotiations. Several forms or channels for non-state actors 
involvement exist to influence the development of norms and policies by international 
governmental institutions: The most common form of this type of influence is non-state actor 
participation as observers in international meetings, negotiations and national delegations. 
Moreover, some international institutions directly seek the expertise and the advice of NGOs 
on specific issues or include NGOs in technical committees or advisory groups. Finally, non-
state actors can strongly influence international policy development by formulating and 
applying norms, standards, codes of conduct, or practices that influence governmental policy 
formulation.  
 
iii) They can contribute to the understanding of international norms and policies through 
dissemination of information to the public, engaging in interpretation of international rules 
and norms, and by contributing to international adjudication by making amicus curiae 
(friends-of-the-court) submissions.  
 
iv) They can support the implementation of international environmental policies by advising 
state actors, supporting state implementation and by performing operational functions 
themselves.  
 
v) Finally, they can support compliance with commitments and policies by monitoring state 
action, by drawing the public attention to implementation problems, sue institutions at the 
national level for non-action, and, in specific environmental regimes, by triggering 
compliance procedures, i.e. initiate the procedure established by any given international 
environmental agreement to assess the compliance of its parties with the obligations under 
the agreement.31 
 
These contributions of non-state actors to the process of developing, implementing, and 
monitoring international environmental policies undoubtedly increase the quality of international 
regulations and policies and improve the outcomes associated with them. Thus, it is not the 
misleading claim of a higher democratic legitimacy that makes NGO participation desirable, but 
the fact that NGO participation may provide additional views and proficiency and that they 
promote transparency and accountability. Clearly, NGO and stakeholder involvement does 
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generally increase the legitimacy of international decision-making even if NGOs are unable to 
address the “democratic deficit” of environmental governance. However, in order to ensure that 
such benefits of stakeholder and NGO participation are possible, it is crucial that non-state actors 
do have specific expertise and actively accompany, monitor and support the governmental 
negotiations. And, it is important that the processes are organized in a manner which allows for 




5. Getting Beyond the Zero-Sum Game Mentality between State and Non-
State Actors with Respect to Stakeholder Participation 
 
The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) has been praised in the 
past for having been a pioneer in engaging non-governmental actors, for organizing rich and 
stimulating multi-stakeholder dialogues at each of its meetings, and for including NGO 
representatives in many of its official government delegations. However, a critical analysis of the 
stakeholder and NGO participation of the CSD would come to less positive conclusions. Most of 
the time, the multi-stakeholder segment does not provide for active interaction between state and 
non-state actors but rather, is a platform for repeating already-known positions instead of a 
forum for collective brain-storming that provides new insights, expertise and stimulates new 
ideas that would be relevant for the issues under debate. A more provocative description would 
even argue that the CSD stakeholder dialogues—which, in the interest of political correctness, 
are openly lauded as enlightening, thought provoking and crucial for quality and success of the 
CSD deliberations—have evolved into formalized rituals that restrict the non-state actors’ 
impact. As a result, each year non-state representatives repeat more or less the same mantras, 
which too often fail to provide useful insights or tangible approaches to addressing the issues 
under consideration. The fact that a representative of the indigenous people is wearing a 
marvellous dress does not guarantee that his or her intervention is enlightening; the fact that the 
presence of a youth delegate is refreshing does not add value to the substance of his or her 
contributions; and the fact that a representative of the environmental community is deeply 
concerned about the issues under discussion does not guarantee a constructive analysis of the 
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problem at hand. Additionally, as a time specifically demarcated for non-state actor involvement, 
the introduction of multi-stakeholder segments has provided an excuse for excluding non-state 
actors from other parts of the CSD sessions. 
 
Given the fact that the multi-stakeholder segments do not provide additional or new insights in 
the issue under debate, the governmental delegations often use the multi-stakeholder segment to 
work on their position or to consult and coordinate informally. However, as it would be 
considered as political incorrect if a national delegation did not attend the multi-stakeholder 
segment, leaving its seat in the meeting room empty during this time, an intern, a junior member 
of the delegation or the NGO-representative in the government delegation is often sent to attend 
the multi-stakeholder segment so as to mark governmental presence and interest. Later in the 
process, as delegations exchange non-non papers32 and begin to negotiate in small informal-
informal contact groups33, which perhaps due to their unofficial nature are absolutely vital to the 
negotiation process, NGOs and non-state representatives are excluded. And in the final 
negotiation phase when delegates are overwhelmed with work and responsibilities, they no 
longer have the time to respond to questions or contemplate potentially important proposals that 
NGOs attempt to introduce to the state representatives. Although a simplified—and thus, 
potentially controversial—picture of the dynamics within the CSD, the above description 
highlights important shortcomings of the current system that are too often overlooked.34  
 
Thus, the once-commended NGO and stakeholder participation at the CSD is not an adequate 
example of the positive impact of proactive involvement of non-state actors. CSD multi-
stakeholder segments fail to ensure that non-state actors provide useful forms of expertise that 
could be usefully employed by delegates. Additionally, these segments do not provide sufficient 
in-depth interaction between non-state actors and other delegates. Despite the shortcomings of 
multi-stakeholder segments, non-state representatives have greatly appreciated their inclusion in 
the formal agenda; as non-state actors have come to increasingly enjoy their new formal role, 
they have consequently begun to behave more formally. However, it seems that the 
formalization35 and proceduralization36 of stakeholder participation has not furthered its impact 
and value. While some thought that formalizing the stakeholder participation would not only 
secure a prominent time-slot for interaction with non-state actors but also give more weight and 
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importance to the non-state actors as such, the reality seems to be that by allocating specific time 
segments to NGOs and by formalizing their participation in the deliberations of governmental 
representatives, flexibility and dynamic have been lost. Additionally, the formal multi-
stakeholder segment has legitimized the exclusion of non-state actors from the other parts of the 
process, namely the less formal part where concrete results are negotiated. 
 
In order to change the current procedure, non-state actors would have to be ready to renounce the 
time, procedural certainty, and formality that is allocated to them in the formal multi-stakeholder 
segment; delegates would have to invest real interest to exchange with non-state actors; or time 
that is reserved for governmental-only deliberations would have to be opened for non-state 
participation. However, non-state actors do not seem to be ready to give up what they have 
gained—namely, the special segment formally allocated to them as well as the semi-official 
status they have earned through this formalization; on the other hand, Government delegates are 
not ready to sacrifice any more of “their time” during CSD meetings to NGOs. It seems that the 
formalization and proceduralization of NGO participation in the CSD—and in many other 
processes—have lead to a zero-sum game where no party is benefiting from the contributions of 
the other. This suboptimal result cannot be rectified without reforming the zero-sum game 
mentality held by each of the parties at hand. 
 
The benefits of expunging this zero-sum game mentality from environmental governance are 
clear. For example, there are other cases marked by more dynamic, direct and active non-state 
actor participation where a more fruitful non-state actor involvement has been reached due to a 
cooperative approach taken by state and non-state actors. One such example is the process to 
develop the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM).37 The 
decision to develop SAICM was taken in 2004. In light of the desire to bring in the specific 
knowledge and expertise of the non-state actors involved in chemicals management issues, the 
need for a strong and direct involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the process was accepted 
from the beginning of the process. Thus, NGOs were allowed to participate fully in all of the 
work of the SAICM Preparatory Committee and to attend as equal partners both the formal 
sessions and the informal negotiations. Over sixty NGOs from the agriculture, development, 
environment, health, industry, and labour sectors participated actively in the negotiations of 
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SAICM with the full right to take the floor, express their views and make constructive proposals. 
Throughout the SAICM process, NGOs brought valuable expertise and knowledge and in the 
end, many of their ideas and proposals were taken up.38 The adoption of SAICM was attended by 
over 140 governments, 60 specialized NGOs and 20 intergovernmental organizations from the 
agriculture, development, environment, health, industry and labour sector, a magnitude and 
diversity of attendees that lent the revolutionary stress on stakeholder participation even greater 
significance. 
 
Several reasons made this participatory approach so productive: NGO participation at SAICM 
was not restricted by formalized procedures or a constrained stakeholder segment; NGO’s 
greatly invested in their SAICM participation, coming well-prepared with specific, concrete 
proposals; NGOs coordinated effectively among themselves and with governments throughout 
the process and they were clearly not perceived as competitors to the states but as active and 
competent partners. One could even argue that within the SAICM-setting, it has been possible to 
leave the traditional interstate paradigm and to move towards a collective concern or community 
interest approach.39 In this case, extensive NGO participation was not sought in order to achieve 
greater democratic legitimacy but rather in order to tap stakeholders’ practical expertise and 
competency. 
 
Thus, there seem to be at least six fundamental differences between a CSD-like zero-sum game 
mentality case and the more dynamic SAICM model: (i) while the participation of non-state 
actors within the CSD is focused on a formalized stakeholder dialogue, this is not the case in the 
SAICM process; ii) while the CSD is perceived as a process dealing with the broad, overarching 
theme of sustainable development, SAICM addresses a more specific issue; iii) while the CSD 
seems to have attracted non-state representatives with a less focused background, less specialized 
expertise and little commitment to focus on the very details of the ongoing discussions between 
the government delegates, SAICM has attracted NGOs with specific expertise and knowledge in 
chemicals management; iv) while the non-state actors often formulate general and broad views 
not directly linked to the issues under debate at the CSD, they have provided specific comments 
and proposals during the SAICM process; v) while in the CSD-process the formalized multi-
stakeholder segments are sometimes perceived as non-productive, so non-state actors are too 
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often viewed as obstacles, stakeholders have been seen as competent partners bringing in needed 
expertise and information in the SAICM-process; and vi) while governments often primarily 
focus on the defence of their personal interests within the CSD, they have tended to search for 
solutions to pressing common challenges in the SAICM context. 
 
For the CSD and other environmental governance structures, a move beyond the zero-sum game 
mentality towards a more flexible system that allows for direct interaction between state and 
non-state actors throughout the process would probably require several changes:  
 
• De-formalization of participation: 
Formalization and proceduralization by allocating preset and thus limited segments to 
stakeholders excludes them from other parts of the debate. It makes it easy for government 
representatives to escape interaction with non-state actors. Formalization and 
proceduralization also seem to attract non-state actors with less specific expertise and 
those that are inclined to focus on the form of participation and not the substance of 
contribution. Formalization and proceduralization should be replaced with more flexible 
meeting structure that allows for direct and spontaneous interaction between state and 
non-state actors. At the same time, non-state actors should not internalize form and 
procedure, but remain innovative and thought-provoking participants. 
 
• Generality of expertise and input should be exchanged for specificity:  
A key benefit of non-state involvement in policy deliberation is the specific expertise and 
information that they can provide and the fact that they may formulate interests and views 
that otherwise might have been lost in a state-centric process. By broadening the 
information base, they can contribute to an improvement in the quality of decision-
making. Therefore, NGOs must not repeat generalities but focus on making specific 
comments and proposals on issues under debate. 
 
• Non-state and state actors as partners not as competitors:  
State actors should perceive the non-state actors not as competitors for time or influence 
but as partners who provide for the specific insights and information needed. At the same 
time, it is crucial that these partners, focusing on their role to broaden the information 
base for good decision making, do not perceive government representatives as enemies of 
the public interest who defend a short-term interest of a small privileged elite whenever 
government representatives take a different view than the one promoted by non-state 
actors. They must go beyond simple accusation and try to understand the concerns and 
challenges that the government actors face and contribute actively to a common search 






This paper has argued that formalization and proceduralization of stakeholder participation may 
lead—and has led in certain processes such as the CSD—to a non-productive zero-sum game 
situation. Stakeholder participation, when excessively formalized and proceduralized, risks 
becoming an inefficient, crude ritual in which stakeholder influence is limited and the process of 
interaction between state and non-state contributors fails to be interactive and dynamic. 
Moreover, such a system is conducive to a less-than-desirable situation where the non-state 
actors most familiar with the system and its procedures will have their voices heard, while those 
non-state actors with the most needed expertise on a specific issue under debate will remain 
silenced. This will lead to zero-sum game situation where neither NGOs nor Governments are 
willing to change their allocation of time and resources, and any gains in time allotted to one 
party are seen as direct setbacks by the other. Although all sides are not entirely satisfied with the 
situation, each side fears losing more than they might gain if the arrangement were to be 
changed; NGOs would not be ready to lose their formal (but nonetheless limited) platform of 
influence and governments would not want to lose what they have been able to maintain as a 
“government only” sphere of policy making; both sides are afraid of “unknown territories” of 
state and non-state interaction. 
 
Comparing the UN Commission for Sustainable Development—an example illustrating the zero-
sum game situation of stakeholder participation—with the Strategic Approach to International 
Chemicals Management—an example with active and dynamic stakeholder involvement—it 
seems that NGO and stakeholder involvement is less effective in processes which address broad 
issues at a general level and where NGO and stakeholder involvement is strongly formalized and 
institutionalized. Such processes will attract NGOs with a less focused background, less 
specialized expertise and little commitment to focus on the very details of the ongoing 
discussions between the government delegates. However, because of the zero-sum game 
situation, it is difficult to move from such a formalized and static situation towards a more 
dynamic and interactive process. A move beyond this suboptimal situation, such as the one in the 
CSD, would require several changes: (i) de-formalization of participation: limited segments 
allowed to stakeholders and excluding them from other parts of the debate should be replaced 
with interaction throughout the whole process; (ii) generality with respect to NGO backgrounds 
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should exchanged for specificity: NGOs should bring in specific expertise and they should make 
specific comments and concrete proposals on issues under debate; (iii) non-state actors as 
partners not as competitors: state actors should perceive the non-state actors not as competitors 
for time or influence but as partners bringing insights needed in the common search for the best 
solutions for environmental issues.  
 
It seems as though the key challenge to today’s international environmental governance is not the 
lack of a strong and authoritative central institution addressing the main existing and emerging 
issues and providing overarching policy guidance, nor is it a “democratic deficit” or insufficient 
NGO and stakeholder involvement. Rather, the main challenge is the lack of political will, 
political commitment and prioritization of environmental interests. This lack of political will and 
commitment and lack of political prioritization of environmental concerns, however, cannot be 
an excuse for inadequate environmental policy. While the strength of a certain regime and the 
effectiveness of policies are a reflection of political will and political prioritization, political will 
and prioritization are not a given fact that cannot be influenced. By raising public awareness of 
challenges and problems and by monitoring policy development and implementation NGOs can 
become a strong force in addressing this exact fundamental failing of today’s system of 
environmental governance. As long as today's overly formalized systems of non-state actor 
participation in processes of international environmental governance are maintained, NGOs and 
other non-state bodies will remain sub-optimally limited in their functionality. Until reform on 
this front is enacted, NGOs ought to devote their energies to raising awareness and lobbying at 
the national level when outside of the formalized processes of negotiation, and focus on their role 
as governance watchdogs when within. Specializing in these roles while shying away from 
certain international governance processes that constrain non-state actors through over-
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